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INTRODUCTION: THE PERSISTENCE
OF ROMANTICISM

It is no news that Romanticism has had a bad press throughout much of
the twentieth century, rising to a chorus of vilification in the past fifteen
or so years. Romantic works are thought to suffer from overweening senti
mentality and to retail a stale plot that is at best trivial and at worst a sham
that distracts attention from the real forces that shape most human lives.
Typically, it is thought, a Romantic poem will present an isolated male pro
tagonist who reflects on his life in strongly subjective terms as he is halted
in a particular place. The course of this reflection runs roughly; “Here I
am in the woods. Life has been pretty tough. I have trouble getting along
with other people, and Tm going to die. I don’t feel very good about that.
But it’s pretty nice here, and when I look at the sunlight on the trees be
low, then I feel a little calmer and able to go on a bit.”'
There is more than a little truth in this caricature, and even Romanti
cism’s defenders often revert to it. Rene Wellek notes the importance to
Romanticism of reflection-in-nature, coupled with an intensified subjective
diction in which individual experiences and reflections are taken to ex
emplify general human possibilities of an accession to meaningfulness, as
he defines Romanticism compactly as “imagination for the view of poetry.
1 I owe this characterization of Romantic poetry to Stanley Bates, who reports that something
like this is the typical structure of submissions that he has had to evaluate for placement in
poetry workshops.
1
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nature for the view of the world, and symbol and myth for poetic style. ”2
Donald G. Marshall similarly fills in what he calls “the common view” that
in Wordsworth the synthetic, creative and sympathetic power of imagination, nour
ished on a popular tradition of ballad and romance with roots in the great poetry
pre-dating the Enlightenment, asserted itself against an instrumentalist reason,
which in poetry took the form of a masquerade in the robes of conscious and
merely willed classicism. Wordsworth found the true source of imagination: in na
ture and particularly in the poet’s experience of nature during childhood, when
he was most open to its varied and spirited influence. The language in which this
recollected experience was transformed into the guide of later life and feeling de
rived from the ordinary language of men, particularly rural men, whose lives pre
served the great rhythms of pastoral and agricultural life, recorded in and medi
ated by the Bible, anonymous folk poetry, and related literary forms.®

Some commentators tend to emphasize one of these three elements imagination, nature-place, or prophetic ordinary language - at the ex
pense of the other two. Charles Larmore notes that it is “something of a
cliche that the Romantics introduced a new sense of belonging” both to
a place and to a particular human community identified with a specific
place. Larmore defends this sense of belonging by endorsing J. G. Her
der’s thought that “The blurred heart of the indolent cosmopolitan is a
shelter for no one.”** Herder returning from Italy to Weimar and Words
worth returning from France to the Lake District are central images of Ro
manticism’s actual and imaginative itinerary, under this emphasis. Already
in 1793 Wordsworth’s sense in Descriptive Sketches of natural sites of recov
ery was attacked as cliched by Thomas Holcroft.
He is the happiest of mortals, and plods, and is forlorn, and has a wounded heart.
. . . More descriptive poetry! Have we not enough! Must eternal changes be rung
on uplands and lowlands, and nodding forests, and brooding clouds, and cells, and
dells, and dingles?®
2 Rene Wellek, “The Concept of Romanticism in Literary Scholtirship,’’ Comparative Literature
1 (1949),pp. 1-23, 147-72; reprinted in Wellek, Concqbts of Criticism (New Haven: Yale Uni
versity Press, 1963), p. 161.
3 Donald G. Marshall, “Forward: Wordsworth and Post-Enlightenment Culture,” in Geoffrey
H. Hartman, The Unremarkable Wordsworth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1987), pp. vii-xxiii, at p. vii.
4 Charles Larmore, The Romantic Legacy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 24,
38-9, citing J. G. Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophic der Geschichte der Menschheit (1784), bk. 8, §5.
See also James Chandler, Wordsworth's Second Nature: A Study ofthe Poetry and Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984), for a development of this Burkean theme in Wordsworth.
5 Thomas Holcroft, Monthly Review (October 1793), pp. 216-18; cited in Kenneth R. Johnston,
The Hidden Wordsworth: Poet, Lover, Rebel, Spy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), p. 332.
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Larmore elsewhere stresses the Romantic conception of the powers and
importance of individualized “creative-responsive imagination,” aptly not
ing both that Romantic individualism stands in tension with the emphasis
on belonging and that his own project is only selectively “to draw out those
strands of the Romantic legacy that connect with our present interests. ”6
According to this conception, “our sense of reality, and of the claims it
makes on us, is inseparable from the creative imagination.”7 We see and
feel and hear not just naked material quiddities, but the sunlight and the
breeze in thatjagged fir tree, or playing over that ruined sheepfold, togeth
er vdth attendant memories and anticipations of achievement and loss, en
durance and mortality.® The thought here is that without the exercise of
imaginatively informed, thoughtful perception there is no human habita
tion of reality, no place in reality for human life. It is creative-responsive
imagination that both finds habitations for mindedness within natural real
ity and envisions further ideal habitations in the face of present disappoint
ments. In exercising creative-responsive imagination, the Romantic poet
aims, in Larmore’s phrase, not only at the sublime but also at “the recov
ery of the ma^c of everyday
Hegel likewise trenchantly notes the emphasis in Romantic art on the
individual mind’s internal motions of perception fused with envisioning,
in order to criticize its subjectivism, himself arguing that a lasting home
for humanity can be found only in the development of appropriate social
institutions, not within the individual mind.
Now since spirituality has [in Romantic art] withdrawn into itself out of the exter
nal world and immediate unity therewith, the sensuous externality of shape is for
this reason accepted and represented ... as something inessential and transient;
and the same is true of the subjective finite spirit and will, right down to the partic
ularity and caprice of individutdity, character, action, etc., of incident, plot, etc. The
aspect of externtd existence is consigned to contingency and abandoned to the ad
ventures designed by an imagination whose caprice can mirror what is present to it,
exactly as it w, just as readily as it can jumble the shapes of the external world and
distort them grotesquely. For this external medium has its essence and meaning
no longer, as in classical art, in itself and its own sphere, but in the heart which
finds its manifestation in itself instead of in the external world and its form of real
ity, and this reconciliation with itself it can preserve or regain in every chance, in
6 Larmore, Romantic Legacy, pp. 7, 35.
7 Ibid., p. 8.
8 Larmore elegantly traces the attendance of perception by memory and anticipation and
thought in Wordsworth’s “Michael,” ibid., pp. 8-9.
9 Ibid., p. 10.
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every accident that takes independent shape, in all misfortune and grief, and in
deed even in crime.

The most capacious vision of Romanticism as a set of commitments
draws together the emphases on nature and imagination, as it sees poets
forging modes of speech, nurtured by natural places and formed in imag
ination, that enable them to function as the vates of either a nation or hu
manity at large, as they and their audiences might recover from political
despair. Writing in 1963, M. H. Abrams argues that the central Romantic
poems - preeminendy Wordsworth’s Prelude, with the “Prospectus” to The
Recluse \2i^en as affording its plot archetype - ’’turn on the theme of hope
and joy and the temptation to abandon all hope and fall into dejection and
despair.”11 Within a movement in Wordsworth’s experience that Abrams
terms “the apocalypse of imagination,”
the militancy of overt political action has been transformed into the paradox of
spiritual quietism: under such militant banners is no march, but a wise passiveness.
. . . And something close to Wordsworth’s evolution - the shift to a spiritual and
moral revolution which will transform our experience of the old world - is also
the argument of a number of the later writings of Blake, Coleridge, Shelley, and,
with all his differences, Holderlin.12

Eight years later, in Natural Supernaturalism, Abrams expands this char
acterization as he describes a general Romantic effort “to reconstitute the
grounds of hope and to announce the certainty, or at least the possibility,
of a rebirth in which a renewed mankind will inhabit a renovated earth
where he will find himself thoroughly at home.”'® The central metaphor
in Abrams’s conception of Romanticism’s aims, and even of its accomplish
ment that he would urge us to repeat, is that of rebirth, renewal, renova
tion in a place, on grounds, at home. This rebirth is to be shared in by hu
manity in general, as it awakens or reawakens to possibilities of human life
in nature, through following and sharing imaginatively in the movement
of the poet’s exemplary mind-in-nature. Wordsworth’s “song will be an
evangel to effect a spiritual resurrection among mankind - it will ‘arouse
10 G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel’s Introduction to Aesthetics, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford Uni
versity Press, 1979), p. 81. First emphasis added.
11 M. H. Abrams, “English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age,” in Romanticism Reconsidered,
ed. Northrop Frye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 26-72, at p. 55.
12 Ibid., pp. 53, 58, 59-60.
13 Abrams, Natural Supematuralism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1971), p. 12.
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the sensual from their sleep /Of death’ [“Prospectus to The Recluse” lines
813-14] - merely by showing what lies within any man’s power to accomplish, as
he is here emd now.”''* Humanity is to come to live not only in hope but
further in accomplishment of felt meaningfulness through finding, in the
poet’s exemplary progress, how mind and nature are fitted to one anoth
er, so as to sustain a human life of hope, fulfillment, and social peace un
der the terms of a larger, naturalized-supernatural covenant.
Impressive though this picture is of the poet as seer, possessed of a power
ful imagination stimulated by a natural place into the production of vision
on behalf of humanity, it is also not hard to see how it can be criticized. In
broadest terms. Romanticism is typically faulted, following Hegel’s lead,
for its subjectivism: too much visionary blathering; too litde attention to
both material reality and social forces. Larmore, who notes this criticism
in order himself then to defend the Romantic imagination, unpacks the
charge against Romanticism of subjective occasionalism, put forward by the
early-twentieth-century political theorist Carl Schmitt. According to this
charge.
Refusing to acknowledge the demands that reality places upon thought, [the Ro
mantics] see the world as but the occasion for the artistic mind to assert its sov
ereignty. Reality counts only as the pretext for the imagination to express itself,
to make up how it would like things to be, to “aestheticize.” For the Romantic,
Schmitt writes, “everything becomes an occasion for anything.”'®

Romanticism is here stigmatized as a poetry of self-indulgence and evasion.
This criticism of Romanticism as a form of subjectivism has taken two
different but related forms, depending on the critic’s sense of the natures
of the material and social realities that Romanticism supposedly evades.
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, and continuing up until at least
the mid-i 960s, Romanticism was criticized for sentimentalism, or wallow
ing in the personal, at the expense of a due respect for social convention,
social order, and the classic. This line of criticism was most prominently
furthered by T. S. Eliot, as for example in “Tradition and the Individual
Talent” (1919), where he criticizes “our tendency, ” generated by our own
uncritical absorption in Romantic sentimentalism, “to insist, when we
praise a poet, upon those aspects of his work in which he least resembles
14 Ibid., p. 27.
15 Larmore, Romantic Legacy, p. 4, citing Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik (Berlin: Duncker
and Humblot, igig), p. 24.
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anyone else.”i6 In fact Eliot’s position, even in this essay, modulates toward
something more interesting than a simple defense of the classic and of reg
nant social values, as he later acknowledges that “the mind of Europe . . .
is a mind which changes” and that “newness is essential,” at least the sort
of newness that engages with and modifies an “ideal order” of “existing
monuments. A purer defense of classicism against Romanticism appears
in Irving Babbitt’s somewhat earlier The New Laokoon (1910). Babbitt criti
cizes Romanticism, exemplified for him by Rousseau and Wordsworth, for
its “eleutheromania: the instinct to throw off. .. all limitations whatsoever.
Babbitt finds Tolstoy guilty of this in the largeness of his sympathies, Nietz
sche in his resistances to any checks on his will, and Schlegel in nearly
everything. To give way to this instinct is to reject a “true humanism” (189)
and instead to allow one’s mind simply to wander, substituting reverie for
thought that grasps the nature and importance of social order. “Words
worth,” Babbitt writes, “would have us believe that to become wise a man
needs merely to sit down on an ‘old gray stone’ and ‘dream his time away.’
... The romantic indolence ... [has] no ‘determinate object’ and [is] not
truly selective” (188—9). Against these lacks of selectivity and focus on an
object. Babbitt defends, to the point of hysteria, “the truly classic,” that
which honors “the broad, masculine, and vigorous distinction” (x), in con
trast with Romantic confusion, which is “intended primarily for women
and men in their unmasculine moods - for the tired scientist and the
fagged philologist and the weary man of business” (244). In calling for a
renovated classicism in literature and criticism. Babbitt seeks to reinstall
an order of decorum and taste, a set of boundaries, that is simultaneously
aesthetic and social, against what he sees as a gathering flood of sentiment,
populism, femininity, and confusion. It is not uncommon still to hear Ro
manticism described and criticized in these terms in casual conversation.
A second, stronger indictment of Romanticism as subjective evasion has
developed over the past fifteen or so years, under the influence of late
Marxist theories of the influence of social structures on artistic production.
Romantic tracings of movements of situated imagination ^lre seen here too
as evasions of the social, but this time of the recognition of a social order
suffused with opposition and antagonism. Thus John Barrell charges that
the composure or balance that is represented, he thinks, ais the outcome
of the isolate imagination’s encounter with nature in the typical Romantic
16 T. S. Eliot, “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” The Egoist (1919); reprinted in The Nor
ton Anthology ofEnglish Literature, eds. M. H. Abrams etal. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1974),
vol. 2, pp. 2198-2205, at p. 2198.
17 Ibid., pp. 2200, 2199-2200, 2199.
18 Irving Babbitt, The New Laokoon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910), p. 196.
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poem is an image of human accomplishment that serves not the interests
of persons in general, but the sectarian interests of the middle class and
of men.
[The] notion of balance, as something which proceeds from a position beyond the
political, is in fact a thoroughly political notion. That position, a middle point be
tween and above all merely partial and particular situations, bears a close resem
blance to a certain ideal construction of the situation of the middle class — neither
aristocratic nor vulgar, neither reactionary nor progressive. And similarly, the bal
ance and resolution which literary texts seek to achieve bear a close resemblance
to the political balance which, in England especially, was both cause and effect
of the increasing power of the middle class, and which has made the notion of
“balance” itself a term of value with a crucial function in middle-class ideology, un
derwriting the political authority of “consensus” or the “middle ground,” by rep
resenting as irrational extremism whatever cannot, or whatever refuses to be, gath
ered into the middle ground___The universal, the fully human position, from
which properly literary texts, and properly literary criticism, can be produced, is
also a masculine position.

Even more shairply, Marjorie Levinson argues that the Romantic imagina
tion’s encounter with nature is both a suppression of the political and, as
such, a weapon in the class struggle. That encounter props up the fiction
- useful to the middle class in its struggle for social hegemony - that the
most important human problems can be solved through taking a walk in
the woods.
Romantic transcendence is a bit of a white elephant. . . . No one would wish to
deny the heroic uses of retreat, but one would wish to see whether they also serve
more urgent interests, such as accommodating the poet to the dominant social struc
tures, without whose recognition he has no voice to praise or condemn his times.
... In order to hear again the voice of a man speaking to men, one must expose
that powerful definition as a platform, one that denies the historicity and instru
mentality of literature.^®

Working out this stance through a close reading of Wordsworth’s “Tintern
Abbey” in particular, Levinson argues that the poet “excludes from his field
certain conflictual sights and meanings - roughly, the life of things” (25):
class conflict over the possession of the instruments of the reproduction
of social life. “The primary poetic act [of ‘Tintern Abbey’] is the suppres-

19 John Harrell, Poetry, Language and Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988),
pp. 5-6.
20 Matjorie Levinson, Wordsworth’s Great Period Poems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986), pp. 57, 56.
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sion of the social. [It] achieves its fiercely private vision by directing a con
tinuous energy toward the nonrepresentation of objects and points of view
expressive of a public - we would say, ideological - dimension” (37-8).
Levinson supports these claims by undertaking “to elaborate some gener
al, then concrete and immediate conditions of the poem’s transcendentalizing impulse” (25), that is, to trace the linguistic mechanisms through
which details of social life are noticed by the poet and then overwritten
or subjectivized as privately symbolic. To a canny reader, “Tintern Abbey”
then emerges as a “palimpsest” (34) whose overwritings and suppressions
ctm be read, in specific detail, as archetypes of ultimately self-betraying Ro
mantic evasion in general.
The charge against Romanticism of the evasion of social retility has been
worked out most fully - in the widest theoretical terms and with reference
to various Romantic authors and poetic strategies - byjerome J. McGann
in The Romantic Ideology. McGann too notes
that familiar argument of Romantic and Romantic-influenced works: that poetry,
and art in general, has no essential relation to partisan, didactic, or doctrinal mat
ters. . . . Romantic poetry develops an argument that [complex sociopolitical di
visions and conflicts] can only be resolved at the level of the mind’s idea or the
heart’s desire. The Romantic position ... is that the poet operates at such levels
of reality, and hence that poetry by its nature can transcend the conflicts and tran
siences of this time and that place.

McGann too criticizes this position as an evasion and suppression of socio
political conflict as the real life of things. Romantic poems, he writes, “tend
to develop different sorts of artistic means with which to occlude and dis
guise their involvement in a certain nexus of historical relations. This act
of evasion, as it were, operates most powerfully whenever the poem is most
deeply immersed in its cognitive (i.e., its ideological) materials and com
mitments” (82).
A principal reason why we are now able to be aware of Romantic plots
and philosophical stances as occlusions and evasions, according to Mc
Gann, is that our sociopolitical position is different. Though we are nei
ther free of nor clear-sighted about our own entanglements in historical
nexus of power and conflict, we are at least differently entangled, so that
we are afforded some distance from and some vision of what is now for us
past. In McGann’s formulation,
21 JeromeJ. McGann, The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation (Chicago: University of Chi
cago Press, 1983), p. 69.
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This book conceives that our present culture has advanced, for better and for
worse, well beyond those forms of consciousness which came to dominance in the
Romantic Period and which are the object of this study.... In my view ideology
will necessarily be seen as false consciousness when observed from any crihcaZ van
tage, and particularly from the point of view of a materialist and historical criticism.
Since this book assumes that a critical vantage can and must be taken toward its
subject, the ideology represented through Romantic works is a fortiori seen as a
body of illusions. (13, 12)

To suppose otherwise - that is, not to see that we are beyond Romanticism,
and not to “clarify and promote” our difference from it - is “to serve only
the most reactionary purposes” (2) of one’s society. It is to be a conserva
tor both of increasingly stale literary values and of social orders that can
prop themselves up only through repression, in the face of the continuing
historical dynamics of material class struggles.
Here McCann’s analysis, drawing on the late Marxisms of Althusser (see
Chapter 9) and Macherey, emphasizes the dynamic persistence of strug
gles over the means of the reproduction of social life and over the social
surplus generated in a reproduction cycle. Different groups have different
relations to these means and different legally sanctioned entitlements to
shares in the surplus; but always there is an underlying “truth about social
relations: that the rich and the ruling classes dominate the poor and the
exploited” (8). Romanticism - functioning in its own terms of imagination
and nature as “a closed idealistic system” (9), according to McCann - is
simply, or not so simply, one complex, self-deluding story about human
powers and possibilities of life that is retailed by intellectuals who are them
selves the “first dupes” (8) of the social system they elaborate and defend.
It is, McCann argues, all too understandable, and human, and interest
ing that self-deluding idealist defenses of always already-decaying social
forms should be mounted, particularly by educated intellectuals who re
main just at the margins of the dominant social group. But no such ideal
ist defense of any social forms can either stand or deserve our allegiance.
The configurations of social/material conflict just will change. “Time and
the world’s force will obliterate the material being of the past. ... All hu
man culture is bound for the abyss” (147)It is hard not to feel the force of the critical materialist-historicist stance
that Barrel!, Levinson, and McCann work out, and it would be unreason
able not to feel it. Human history is significantly a record of materially mo
tivated social violence and repression. Barrell, Levinson, McCann, and oth
er critics have found manifold bits of textual detail in which Romantic
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writers seem sotto voce to acknowledge and then insistently to deny the
social conflicts of their times. In reading for such details, criticism of this
kind manages both to avoid aestheticizing the literary text into an object
of absorbed but contentless formal worship and to escape any simple reductionism, insofar as literary texts in general are taken subtly both to re
flect and to engage quasi-critically, through displacement and apparent
counterplotting, with the social conflicts that surround them. It is by no
means clear to which patterns of idealization, to which imaginative envisionings of human possibilities, we ought attach our trusts. Any plots of hu
man possibility, and preeminently Romanticism’s, seem - at least when
most literalized — one-sided, and destined at best to function for a time as
sectarian weapons in the shaping of social imagination, thence to die when
the pattern of regnant social conflict changes and they are no longer ser
viceable.
Yet how are we to react to the facts of persistent socieil/material conflict
and to Romantic envisionings of human possibility in the face of them?
How do we react? Can we, and do we. Just stand apart, critically, in clear
consciousness that Romantic imagination and its material situation are
simply, in McCann’s phrase, “from our point of view - different” (2)? Is it
even so clear that we have quite fully grasped the workings of Romantic
imagination, when we have focused our attentions on its most literalized
envisionings?
Here it is worth noticing what Geoffrey Hartman has aptly called the
“special negativity”22 - the resistance to stable envisioning - of Words
worth’s style and, these essays argue, of Romantic poetic imagination in
general at its most powerful. This resistance in Wordsworth takes the form
of continual swerves back into self-scrutiny, as he anxiously queries his abil
ity to formulate an authoritative doctrine of value (Chapter 6). In Holderlin it takes the form of philosophical stuttering in syntactic ambiguity, leav
ing a demonstrative gesture toward his, and our, divided and self-divided
condition that remains unhealed, in the face of the self-occlusion of the
divine-absolute (Chapters 2, 5, 12). In Keats, and then later in Updike, it
takes the form of allowing envisioning to be distracted by the protagonist’s
intense and unexpected engagements with sensual surfaces, such as those
with which Augustine struggled in attempting to find his plot (Chapter
11). Or it takes the form of multiple, overlapping envisionings, without
any single master plot, and often ending in either ambiguity or tragedy.
The author’s powers of envisioning human freedom and fulfillment are
22 Hartman, Unremarkable Wordsworth, p. 208.

INTRODUCTION

11

exercised, but how fruitfully to go on from these exercises remains unclear
(Chapters 2, 3). There is a pronounced turn in philosophical and poetic
thinking toward criticism, as writers seek to find precursors for their pre
sent efforts in the articulation of value, yet where the precursors they find
remain threatening, one-sided, and not quite receivable, leaving the work
of criticism to go on in further, endless comparisons and shifts of atten
tion (Chapters 7, 10).
Everywhere there is, in the ambiguous genitive of this collection’s title,
the persistence of Romanticism. Romanticism - the effort to envision human
possibilities of the achievement of value, as these are achieved in an exem
plary way in the career of a specially situated protagonist - persists. It re
mains with us as a form of scrutiny of our human possibilities, through and
after the advents of aestheticism, inwardizing modernism, and wider po
litical awareness, because of its own persistence in the open itinerary of
thinking about value, embodied in its own resistances to authoritative clo
sure. As Hartman cannily notes, in Wordsworth at his best, despite the po
et’s lapses into more formed moralizing - and, as the present volume ar
gues, in Romanticism at its best - “the desire for immunity,” from pain,
from suffering, from critical rejection, from human loss and repudiation,
“is stronger than the achieved immunity.”^® The fact of human desire, as
other than animal need and as involving both self-consciousness and con
sciousness of being under the judgmental gaze of others, is bound up with
an effort to achieve fluency in the exercise of human powers to shape a
life as an embodiment of value (see Chapters 2, 3, 12). Romanticism’s
persistences are human desire’s obverse face. Romantic thought presents
not so much conclusions as, in McCann’s useful phrase, “a drama of the
contradictions”24 inherent in the possession of human powers of remem
bering, envisioning, and partial responsiveness to the force of reasons.
McCann similarly notes Romanticism’s beginnings and endings in un
certainties. Its sometime claims of accession to a full understanding of hu
man value are qualified by its strong awareness of the evanescent charac
ter of the encountered object through which such an understanding is to
come.
In a Romantic poem the realm of the ideal is always observed as precarious - li
able to vanish or move beyond one’s reach at any time. . . . [T]he Romantic poem
... characteristically haunts, as Geoffrey Hartman has observed, borderlands and
liminal territories. These are Romantic places because they locate areas of contra23 Ibid., p. 218.
24 McGann, Romantic Ideology, p. 2.
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diction, conflict, and problematic alternatives. In short. Romantic poems take up
transcendent and ideal subjects because these subjects occupy areas of critical un
certainty. (72-3)

These beginnings and endings in liminality, even the disappearance in
to liminality of any clear occasions of beginning and ending, reflect, Mc
Cann argues, a sense of the problematic character of any articulation of
an ideal of value. This sense in turn accounts for the Romantic poem’s
characterisdc inconclusiveness or stumbling into multiple, conflicting con
clusions, its overall lingering in process - a lingering that, for McCann,
is not a face of human desire as such but rather something historically spe
cific that we are beyond.
The displacement efforts of Romantic poetry, its escape trails and pursued states
of harmony and reconciliation - ultimately its desire for process and endless self
reproduction (“something evermore about to be”) - are that age’s dominant cul
tural illusions which Romantic poetry assumes only to weigh them out and find
them wanting. (133)

The strongest form of this finding - the sharpest recognition of the com
plicity of Romantic processualism in disguising ongoing social violence comes for McCann, in a perception he would endorse, in Keats’s “recogni
tion of. .. the horror entailed in the maintenance of and reproduction of
the social structures - of the human life - Keats knew” (133-4) • This rec
ognition signals, for McCann, the end of Romanticism; its difference from
us and our more clear-eyed, Keatsian and Althusserian recognition of how
idealizations are always weapons in social struggles (see Chapters 4, 9).
There can be, in Romanticism’s terms, no demonstrative argument no proof beginning from first premises that unambiguously record ulti
mate realities - that Romantic persistences are anything more than such
weapons, that they are rather or also obverses of human desire and imagi
native power as such. Romanticism begins from a sense of being always al
ready underway in culture and then simply stopped in coming to reflect.
There is no standpoint from which reflection may be conducted apart
from all cultural entanglements. The work of critical reflection takes place
in media res, without a priori Justifications for either choices of texts and
problems or protocols for approaching them.
Yet it does not follow that critical reflection must simply repeat inher
ited cultural entanglements. For one thing, these entanglements are mul
tiple, conflicting, and ambiguous; for another, they can sometimes be rea
sonably integrated, revised, rejected, extended, or balanced one against
another in a course of ongoing cultural work. In place of proof, critical-
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reflective cultural work may aspire to afford persuasive considerations.
Such considerations may then bear on a choice between a McGann-style
external description of Romantic persistence as something that is, for us,
just past and a description of that persistence as something in which we
are entangled. Such considerations would have to be bound up with an
understanding of our own plights, powers, and possibilities, where any in
vitation to share in this understanding could be resolutely, even reasonably,
refused. Yet such an understanding might nonetheless draw us in, by pro
ceeding from extensions and developments of commitments and entan
glements that we can recognize ourselves already to bear.
The idea of an understanding of our plights, powers, and possibilities
that draws us in, yet cannot be grounded in any discovery of properties of
substances, lies at the heart of Kant’s critical philosophy. It is for this rea
son that Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy remark that Kant
“opens up the possibility of romanticism. ”25 This opening up is not simply
a matter of Kant’s work in epistemology but much more of the relation
between that critical epistemology and his conception of ourselves as open
to the possibility of a free life, without, however, any possible guidance
from the knowing of things. We are barred from any dogmatic knowledge
of any ultimate good or any ultimate character of reality, even from any
knowledge of ourselves as moral substances. We can know our empirical
psychological nature and our physical nature - our likes and aversions, and
our masses and chemical compositions - through ordinary scientific psy
chological and scientific physical means, but not our moral nature. Full
self-presence as moral beings eludes us; yet we remain committed to both
independence and justice, to both self-authority and human responsibility.
We are open to the force of continuing obligations, to others and to our
selves, whose specific shapes in contexts can never be wholly deciphered
and can never be wholly grounded in any knowledge of things, empirical
or otherwise. (We may establish certain specific negative obligations not
to infringe the legally enforceable rights of others or ourselves to a fair
chance for the development of our rational humanity, but never the full
specific shapes of positive, imperfect obligations to benevolence and selfcultivation.) In the formulation of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy,
Without oversimplifying or hardening the contours of a question that merits ex
tended analysis, we cannot fail to note that this “subject” of morality [as Kant con
ceives it] can only be defined negatively, as a subject that is not a subject of knowl25 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, trans. Philip Barnard
and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 29.
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edge (this knowledge suppressed “to make room for belieP), as a subject without
mathesis, even of itself. It is indeed posited as freedom, and freedom is the locus
of “self-consciousness.” But this does not imply that there is any cognition - or
even consciousness - of freedom, for freedom in turn is posited only as the ratio
essendi of the moral law within us, which, because it is only a fact {3. factum rationis,
as Kant says), can provide only a ratio cognoscendi of freedom, which produces no
cognition.
What, however, is the nature of this factum rationis, this fact of reason
that we are both free not to act on immediate inclination and further
bound by an obscure normative law for the development of freedom? In
the Critique ofPractical Reason, Kant calls our consciousness of freedom “the
most insoluble of problems, ”27 and he argues that it stems from our prior
awareness of the moral law.
We can neither know [freedom] immediately, since our first concept of it is neg
ative, nor infer [knowledge of freedom] from experience, since experience reveals
us only the law of appearances and consequently the mechanism of nature, the
direct opposite of freedom. It is therefore the moral law, of which we become im
mediately conscious as soon as we construct maxims for the will, which first pre
sents itself to us; and, since reason exhibits it as a ground of determination which
is completely independent of and not to be outweighed by any sensuous condi
tion, it is the moral law which leads directly to the concept of freedom.28
But do we “become immediately conscious” of the moral law “as soon
as we construct maxims for the will”? Exactly how do we do this? At first
blush, I can certainly seem to myself to impose on myself the maxims that
I shall take some aspirin when I have a headache or that I shall button my
shirt from the top down, rather than the reverse, without any considera
tions of morality arising at all. “Nothing in appearances is explained by the
concept of freedom. ”29 I cannot see or hear or touch freedom somehow
in objects. I must rather find it in myself, not as empirical object but as
someone who imposes maxims on myself, and how do I do that? Why must
I do that? What is the nature of this “fact of reason” that we have “con
sciousness of [the] fundamental [moral] law”?39
26 Ibid., p. 31.
27 Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1956), p. 29.
28 Ibid. Compare Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 2d ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1933), A547=B575, pp. 472-3.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 31.
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In a number of places, Kant seems to say that our thinking of ourselves
as both free and bound by a fundamental law is, as it were, a necessary faQon depenser, something that we cannot help thinking but that we cannot
know to be true. In Ptirt III of the Foundations, for example, there are these
passages:
Now I say that every being which cannot act otherwise than under the idea of free
dom is thereby really free in a practical respect. That is to say, all laws which are
inseparably bound up with freedom hold for it just as if its will were proved free
in itself by theoretical philosophy. . . . Reason must regard itself as the author of
its principles, independently of foreign influences; consequently as practical rea
son or as the will of a rational being, it must regard itself as free. That is to say, the
will of a rational being can be a will of its own only under the idea of freedom, and
therefore in a practical point of view such a will must be ascribed to all rational
beings. . . . Freedom is only an idea of reason whose objective reality in itself is
doubtful.®'
These passages seem to say that we think of ourselves as free for practical
purposes, as a kind of story about ourselves that we tell ourselves when
ever we act, but a story that may or may not be true: nothing in the order
of appearances confirms it. Is this enough? Why is it not illusory, or dog
matic, or both, for us to have this understanding of ourselves as free and
bound by the moral law?
Looked at more closely, however, Kant’s account of our commitment to
thinking of ourselves as free presents that commitment as less optional,
less sustained merely for the sake of practical life, and more intimately
bound up with our sense of ourselves as persons than these passages may
initially suggest. One clue to the depth, in Kant’s account, of our commit
ment to thinking of ourselves as free comes when Kant remarks that
it is our reason which through the supreme and unconditioned practical law recog
nizes itselfand the being which knows this law (our own person) . . . [and so] defines
the way in which [a person] can be active as such a being
To be active as a person is to act according to reasons, rather than to have one’s
body move as a result of the impingement of either external or internal
material givens. Action, as opposed to either induced bodily motion or ha
bitual reflex (such as buttoning my shirt), necessarily invokes a sense of
31 Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMorals, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: BobbsMerrill, 1959), [448, 448, 455], pp. 66, 67, 74-5.
32 Kant, Critique ofPractical Reason, pp. 109-10. Emphases added.
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how things ought to be. Taking aspirin when one has a headache is some
thing that, other things being equal (one does not suffer from side effects,
doesn’t have an ulcer, is not a young child, etc.), one has a reason to do.
This reason makes the action intelligible as an action. It refers the action
and its intended end to an order of reasons, according to which things do
not merely happen but, rather, happen insofar as they are judged to be
things a free being, acting on reasons in a context of needs, desires, and
possibilities, would do. This reference to what a free and rational being
would do includes not only actions explicitly done for the sake of duty
(keeping promises and the like) but also prudential actions. It further in
cludes our mental life as such, insofar asjudgingis an activity in which only
a free and rational being can engage, for reasons. Hence Rant observes
that
We cannot conceive of a reason which consciously responds to a bidding from the
outside with respect to its judgments, for then the subject would attribute the de
termination of its power ofjudgment not to reason but to an impulse.^3
Judgment as such, that is to say, is normative. To judge that red is a color or
that an argument is valid or even that it is windy today all involve appeals to
what a reasoning being, aware of the circumstances of the case (how we
sort by color, how we reason argumentatively, what is normally called calm
or windy) would say.
In recent scholarship, Onora O’Neill has been the most articulate elucidator and defender of Kant’s conception of modal reason: of reasons as
inherently involving appeals to what all persons would say were they unimpededly to act in a given circumstance ofjudgment according to their ra
tional nature.34 She has emphasized how judging and thinking as such not just what we typically recognize as cases of moral judgment - involve
33 Kant, foMndadons, [448], pp. 66-7.
34 See Onora O’Neill, “Political Liberalism and Public Reason: A Critical Notice ofJohn Rawls,
Political Liberalism,” Philosophical Review 106, 3 (July 1997), pp. 411-28. In this article, writ
ing explicitly on matters of political right, O’Neill distinguishes between what agents will
(or would) in certain circumstances consent to - the motivational conception of reason from what they could consent to - the modal conception of reason, and she defends the
latter. What matters in political philosophy, she argues, is not what agents will accept, but
what they can accept (pp. 416-17). Here my usage of wouldis much closer to her usage of
can than to her usage of will, and would seems better to fit contexts in which one is making
judgments about Judgments, or moves within practices, that may not require the assent of
all members of a state but only of those within the practice, who are in a position to exer
cise reasonable Judgment within it. The emphasis in both O’Neill’s formulation and mine
is the same: on what all agents in certain circumstances (whoever is in those circumstances)
must say in virtue of their reason.
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taking up a critical standpoint on what one does, trying to make what one
does transparently endorsable (in the given circumstances ofjudgment)
by rational agents as such who act as such. Taking up this critical stand
point involves “self-discipline or autonomy in thinking, ”35 or what one might
conceive as thinking coming into its own, as shaped by reasons. As Pawel
Lukow usefully develops O’Neill’s point, the fact of reason is “a fact sui
generis, constructed out of reflection on the possible activities of our rea
son.”36 According to O’Neill, the Categorical Imperative - the imperative
to act, including the acts ofjudging and thinking, only on the basis of rea
sons that all others can accept - “is the fundamental strategy not just of
morality, but of all activity that counts as reasoned. . . . The Categorical
Imperative is the supreme principle of reasoning not because it is an algo
rithm either for thought or for action, but because it is an indispensable
strategy for disciplining thinking in ways that are not contingent on spe
cific and variable circumstances. ”3^ As Charles Taylor puts it, “even in our
theoretical stance to the world, we are agents. ”3®
Kant himself claims, poignantly and in a little-noticed passage, that “in
the final analysis there can be but one and the same reason which must
be differentiated only in application.”39 There is no ultimate distinction
among theoretical reasoning, prudential reasoning, and moral reasoning.
Each of these forms of reasoning, though they differ in application, in cir
cumstances of exercise, and in governing principles, involves an appeal to
what reasons as such command in situ, hence to what all rational agents
would assent were they to act as rational agents. That we submit ourselves
to reason’s authority is not optional and for the sake of ourselves in prac
tice alone (as though we might be at bottom other than we are in acting);
it is rather built into the very structures of thinking and judging, which are
themselves practices.
It is hard to understand metaphysically how and why this is so. The best
we can do, Kant observes, is to “comprehend [the] incomprehensibility
[of the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative], which
is all that can fairly be demanded of a philosophy which in its principles
35 O’Neill, “Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III,” in O’Neill, Constructions of Reason:
Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989),
pp. 51-65, atp. 56.
36 Pawel Lukow, “The Fact of Reason: Kant’s Passage to Ordinary Moral Knowledge,” KantShirfien 84, 2 (1993), pp. 209-21, atp. 215.
37 O’Neill, “Reason and Autonomy,” pp. 58-9.
38 Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” in Taylor, Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995),pp. 1-19, atp. 11.
39 Kant, Foundations, [391], p. 8.
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strives to reach the limit of human reason.But to the extent that refer
ence to the normative authority of reasons is built into the very structures
of thinking and judging as themselves things that we do, we then become
able - accepting an image of ourselves as thinking and Judging - to see
how it is “impossible for the subdest philosophy as for the commonest
reasoning to argue freedom away.”4i
If we are - at least within this image of ourselves; and can we refuse it?
- necessarily involved in thinking, judging, and acting in an effort to live
according to reasons that anyone would endorse, rather than being driven
always only by impulse, then it is hard to see how we could take a fully ex
ternal attitude toward Romantic persistence as something that is simply
past. We seem to be caught up in what Robert Pippin, paraphrasing Fichte,
has usefully called “an active ‘positing’ of one’s stance toward nature and
one’s desires not originally determined or caused by one’s relation to na
ture or such desires.”42 This active positing is ‘“the condition for the possi
bility’ of all relations to nature ”43 in which thinking, judging beings stand
as thinking, judging beings. One’s ordinary awareness of things is itself in
formed by the implicit awareness that what one is doing when one is re
membering, thinking, or imagining “is an act of remembering, thinking,
or imagining,”44 itself caught up in an active effort to live according to rea
sons. To engage in this active positing is, in Pippin’s useful distinction, “not
to be subject to various motivational forces, but to be the subject 0/one’s
deeds. ”43
Being oneself the subject of one’s deeds, including one’s thinkings and
judgings, in turn supports a moral aspiration to be such a s,\ih]ect fully, free
ly, and wholly according to reason. As Kant puts it,
Man must give [the] autocracy of the soul its full scope; otherwise he becomes a
mere plaything of other forces and impressions which withstand his will, and a prey
to the caprice of accident and circumstance.46

40 Ibid., [463], p. 83.
41 Ibid., [456], p. 75.
42 Robert B. Pippin, “Heideggerian Historicity and Metaphysical Politics,” in Pippin, Idealism
as Modernism: Hegelian Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 395414, at p. 404.
43 Ibid.
44 Pippin, Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind,” in Idealism as Modernism, pp. 29—55, P- 3945 Pippin, “Hegel’s Ethical Rationalism,” in Idealism as Modernism,pp. 417-50, at p. 425.
46 Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1978), p. 140.
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As beings who are open to the authority of reasons, we bear an aspiration
“to live freely,fully in the light of reasons we have articulated for our
selves, in awareness of the nature and proper functioning of our own pow
ers, rather than imbibing them from things.
Suppose we find this image of ourselves as thus caught up in an effort
to live freely to be inescapable, and suppose further that Romantic persis
tence enacts this effort, in awareness of its difficulties. None of this makes
arriving at a life of freedom any easier or any more open to being guided
by specific rules. One will have to balance and integrate independence-be
ing unimpeded by others and undetermined by external givens, in both
thinking and acting, in favor of submission to self-imposed norms - with
coherence: having one’s thinking and acting be transparently endorsable by
others, and by oneself at another time, as reasonable in situ, rather than
being torn apart by conflicting internal desires or being caught up in nec
essarily nonnegotiable social conflict. This is no small task. It is all too
tempting, even seemingly right-minded, to domesticate such an impossi
ble aspiration to freedom. Why not suppose instead, as ethical naturalism
in the style of Bernard Williams or Harry Frankfurt urges, that we do best
not to pursue this aspiration to freedom, but instead honorably and decent
ly to accept the determination of reasons, in contexts, by desires that are
simply, somehow, given? Why can’t, or shouldn’t, practical reason be more
modest, less moralized? Why isn’t Romanticism, with its “heighth” of as
piration, for us a thing of the past? Or why shouldn’t it be?
Yet it is, perhaps, not so easy thus to domesticate an aspiration to free
dom, however difficult it is to fulfill it. The fact of human desire, as op
posed to animal want or need, involves awareness that this-thing-that-is-F
is what one desires. We do not, in desiring, simply incline toward things
but rather conceptualize them as things toward which we incline. Here our
inclinations stand open, as conceptually structured, to assessment in the
light of reasons. Is it true that acquiring this-thing-that-is-F (acquiring this
commodity, establishing this relation with this person, developing this abil
ity) , given my particular talents, limitations, and circumstances, will bring
me into a free life - a life I and others can endorse as free - in light of rea
sons? The possibility of questioning of this kind is built into desiring as op
posed to brute wanting. We seek, in and through desiring action, to be
fully the subjects who we are. In Pippin’s formulation.

47 Pippin, “Introduction,” in Idealism as Modernism, pp. 1-25, at p. 24.
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If I act thoughtlessly, unreflectively or in mere conformity to prevailing conven
tions, I have declined to become the subject of my own deeds, allowing the di
rection of my life to be charted by others and by a complex of contingent psy
chological factors. I achieve this status - “subject” - by being able to evaluate my
inclinations and needs, by being directed by good reasons that I recognize as such.
The great dispute ... is. What will count as such rational self-determination;
especially, what sort of self-legislation will not thereby create a self-alienation?48
That there are givens of material inclination is not to be suppressed in
the name of submission to some empty and arbitrary ideal of rationality.
These givens are rather to be evaluated and integrated, or reshaped, with
in a specifically shaped free and reasonable life in situ, thus avoiding self
alienation. The necessities of avoiding self-alienation, and of leading a life
that is both specifically one’s own and endorsable as reasonable, vdthout
the simple suppression of all material givens, do not make the task of real
izing an aspiration to freedom any easier. One must somehow both “stand
above” and reflect on the worth of what one deeply wants - on whether
fulfilling that want would sustain a life of freedom - without suppressing
all concreteness and material specificity.49 As David Wiggins usefully puts
it, “we need to be able to think in both directions, down from point to the
human activities which answer to it, and up from activities ... to forms
of life in which [persons] by their nature can find point. ”50 Romantics
are paradigm practitioners of this doubly aimed, doubly moving thinking
in situ.
Hence Romanticism in its persistences receives the problem of leading
a life of freedom as a standing problematic ideal: irrepudiable yet in no
way readily or clearly realizable. In the twentieth century, as modernism.
Romanticism takes the form of an effort to find not so much a fully shared
social solution to the problem of freedom but rather a voice to bear, at least
in part, recognizably, a power to address that problem, if not to solve it.
Here one arrives at voice through the criticism and imaginative refigur
ation of existing practices. Hence voice comes to its critical and refigurative authority pardy through comparisons among numbers of finite,
partial exemplars of freedom, and hence further in awareness of its own
limitedness (see Chapters 7-12). In attempting to achieve, enact, and sus48 Pippin, “Hegel, Ethical Reasons, Kantian Rejoinders,” in Idealism as Modernism, pp. 92128, at pp. 98-9.
49 See Ibid., pp. 96-7.
50 David Wiggins, “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life,” Proceedings of the British Acad
emy
(1976), pp. 331-78, atpp. 374-5.
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tain a critical authority that is always partial and problematic, both Roman
tic and modern writers live out a standing fear of nonexistence (see Chap
ters 6, lo, 12). If one does not write, reflect, judge, one finds one’s sense
of oneself as a subject collapsing, in immersion in the conventional and
in material givens. If one does write, reflect, and judge, so as to work out
a critical relation to conventions and material givens, one is in danger of
disengagement, in danger of mad, solipsistic preoccupation. Either way,
one’s life as a subject remains problematic. Romantic writers and thinkers,
whether poets or novelists or philosophers, whether in the nineteenth or
twentieth centuries, are those who write and think anyway.
When one thus writes anyway, in awareness of both the irrepudiability
and immediate unrealizability of a free life, with and for oneself and oth
ers, there is often a pronounced shift away from the declaration of results
and toward immersion in the process of coming to voice, toward writerliness. Following Hegel, but rejecting his dismissal of Romanticism, LacoueLabarthe and Nancy describe this as a shift toward autopoiesis, the attempt
to write a self-writing poem that instances the possibility of coming-to-voice
that it takes as its subject.
Romantic poetry sets out to penetrate the essence of poiesy, in which the literary
thing produces the truth of production in itself, and thus . . . the truth of the pro
duction of itself, of autopoiesy. And if it is true . . . that auto-production constitutes
the ultimate instance and closure of the speculative absolute, then romantic
thought involves not only the absolute of literature, but literature as the absolute.
Romanticism is the inauguration of the literary absolutep^
To conceive of the absolute as literary, or as to be pursued through a poem
or narrative that tracks and enacts coming-to-voice, is to abandon an obser
vational standpoint in favor of immersion in a process. It involves sustain
ing a sense of the deferral of arriving at definite results, a deferral that, in
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s formulation, “aggravates and radicalizes the
thinking of totality and the subject. [The literary Absolute] infinitizes this
thinking,’’52 casting it as ever aiming at freedom, rather than securing it.
This sense of simultaneous direction toward and deferral of the achieve
ment of freedom accounts for the predominance in Romantic writing of
remembrance and anticipation rather than of present statement of the fea
tures of things. The absolute or freedom or the divine lures the poet as
51 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, Literary Absolute, p. 12.
52 Ibid., p. 15.
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occluded; in Wordsworth as “something evermore about to be,”53 in H61derlin as the sense that the Heavenly “once were here and shall come
again, ”54 and in Cavell as a “conception of philosophy as the achievement
of the unpolemical,”55 as a sense “that neither side must win”56 as the selfinterrogating imagination of our possibilities of freedom goes on. Though
there remains a pressing concern for the evaluation of human possibili
ties, there is a shift in writing away from demonstrative argument and the
form of the treatise and toward narrative. Romantic narratives leave us, in
Cavell’s phrase for what surrounds serious philosophy generally, more with
“a trail of images of themselves preparing for philosophy or recovering
from it”5'7 than vdth definite results.
These images of preparation and recovery, and these shifts into writerliness, have various faces in Romanticism’s development. In Holderlin
there is a kind of philosophical stuttering and a defeat of definite state
ment by syntactic ambiguity. The self-occlusion of the divine forces the in
terruption of the poet’s powers of definite statement and shifts the poet
always back into the registers of remembrance and anticipation. In Words
worth there is a turn always back to the rescrutiny of the poet’s fitness or
power to speak about values. The special negativity of Wordsworth s narra
tive imagination is his sense, in tension with his wish to describe definite
shapes of value, of having always to retest and recover his own imaginative
authority in the face of its all-too-likely repudiation by its intended audi
ences. In Byron there is, in McCann’s apt description, “an escapist gesture
of a special sort; not into the future, or into art, but into the flux of every
thing which is most immediate, a flight into the surfaces of poetry and life,
the dance of verse, the high energy of instant sensations and feelings,”58
as though to preserve at least a space in sensation for the operation of
imagination and its cultivation of independence, when that space seems
nowhere present in public life. In Keats, there is a similar escapist linger
ing in aestheticism; in Shelley, a combination of meliorist futurism and
53 William Wordsworth, The Prelude; or, Growth of a Poet’s Mind {iSo^),in’Wor<iswonh, ThePrelude, iy99, i8o^, JS50, eds. Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, and Stephen Gill (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1979), bk. VI, line 608, p. 216.
54 Friedrich Holderlin, “Brod und Wein” /“Bread and Wine,” trans. Michael Hamburger in
Holderlin, Hyperion and Selected Poems, ed. Eric L. Santner (New York: Continuum, 199*^*) >
p. 187.
55 Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1994), p- 2256 Ibid., p. 120.
57 Ibid., p. 3.
58 McCann, Romantic Ideology, p. 127.
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Platonic idealism.59 In Coleridge and in Fichte, there is a continual, self
consuming search, a search with its own narratable shape, as in Biographia
Literaria, for starting points from which one might reason one’s way to cul
tural authority via a specific discursive understanding of the conditions of
freedom.
In twentieth-century modernisms there are both escapes into the allures
of inward artistic subjectivity and a move toward a more hard-edged criti
cism of the vulgarity of the current shapes of public culture. Modernism’s
inwardnesses and efforts at hard-edged criticism remain marked, however,
always by the worry that they are litde different from the subjective inten
sities that they would reject and by a consequent fear of fraudulence.s® A
free modernist constructivism, running provocatively against the grain of
public culture, runs the risks of emptiness, lack of resonance, and the sim
ple repetition of the gestures of scandal. Yet there is no ready way back to
a naive standpoint; there is no simple return to sentiment and nature that
is artistically convincing; there is no simple evasion of the modernist agons
of Schonberg, Pound, or Joyce that continue Romanticism’s efforts by oth
er means, under increased consciousness of social complexities and hostil
ities. (Holderlin’s poetry, both Romantic and, in its difficulty, modernist,
is perhaps the richest response to our plights.) Always it is the dramatic
movement, either the effort to compose a specific understanding of lived
freedom or the frustration of that effort, that draws us in, as Romanticism
lasts longer than we might have thought, in the very movement of its own
persistences.
Persistence in the effort to arrive at voice, on behalf of the rational trans
figuration of one’s self and social life into ajoint life of freedom, involves
a poet, philosopher, critic, or artist in what Kenneth R. Johnston has aptly
called the “practices of any truth-claiming subject. To be caught up as
a subject in the practices of claiming truth about transfigurative possibil
ities of individual and social freedom, contrasted with present individual
and social plights, is to experience culture simultaneously as a present vio
lation of possibilities of the expression of rational nature - as a scene of
violence - and as a clouded vehicle and object of aspiration. Johnston’s de
scription of Wordsworth’s fitful efforts to complete a sketch of the British
Navy fleet in harbor at the Isle of Wight - a sketch that later appears with

59 See ibid., pp. 116-17.
60 See Cavell, “Music Discomposed” and “A Matter of Meaning It,” both in Cavell, Must We
Mean What We Say'? (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969), pp. 180-237.
61 Johnston, Hidden Wordsworth, p. 843.
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more smoothness, more artifice, and less intensity in Book x, lines 290305 of The Prelude- captures the dynamic of the bearing of a sense of cul
ture as jointly violation and vehicle of possibilities of free life.
The poem’s problem ... is the speaker’s inability to negotiate between his distress
over social crises and his love of natural beauty. War fleets spoil a beautiful sunset
here, as a ruined economy and rigid marriage laws cause promiscuous intercourse
and illegitimate children in the “Letter to Llandaff.” Nature has been violated by
Culture: history, politics, and war. Wordsworth literally cannot establish any inter
action between the natural scene and the shadow of the human institutions which
lay cross it: the British navy. The “tranquility” conventionally associated with a
picturesque sunset is canceled out by the “sunset cannon.” But after stuttering
through this crisis point, his descriptive powers suddenly revive, and he ends up
with a poem different from the one he started. The fragment seems to be a sonnet
whose structure has been blown apart by an afterthought, exposing the author’s
determination to be true to actual experience.62
Wordsworth in this fragment aims initially at sanctification of the present,
at showing that the scene he beholds is a fit habitation for humanity; but
his closeness of attention to what he actually beholds undoes this aim,
leaving him stuttering, in possession of a different poem from the one he
began, and seeking, but not knowing how, to arrive at prophetic voice.
Then, somehow, he goes on. He here enacts concretely Kant’s sense in
his “History” essay (see Chapters 2, 3, 8) of natural places and cultural
antagonisms alike as both affordances and hindrances.
To take as one’s focus “the practices of any truth-claiming subject” re
quires an elucidatory criticism in which critical remarks both describe and
stand neighbor to their objects, rather than assuming a loftier evaluative
standpoint above the antagonisms that are played out within these objects.
Numbers of cultural works and descriptive criticisms of them must togeth
er come to form a perspicuous representation (see Chapter 7) > *ti which one
might see in the similarities and differences of neighboring cases how the
plight of humanity in nature and culture is borne. Or one might not. The
possibilities of vision that a perspicuous representation affords can them
selves always be refused. This kind of writing — Romantic or critical — is
powerless to enforce its perceptions through demonstrative argument.
The plights and possibilities of human subjects as bearers of intentionality are tracked, in this kind of criticism, as always involving both open
ness to the force of reasons, associated with a desire for rational transpar62 Ibid., pp. 344-5-
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ency to oneself and others, and the frustration and continuance of this
desire in and through its encounters with cultural antagonisms. As Charles
Larmore develops a thought of Romanticism that he endorses, “We can
not honesdy profess a wholehearted identification with any inherited way
of life. ”63 Our condition is more immigrant than that, more marked by crit
ical reflection and by a desire for rational transparency that we know not
how to still.
There are some shifting stylistic marks of the bearing of an intense sense
of standing human plights and possibilities. These marks are especially
prominent in Romantic writing, whether philosophical, poetic, novelistic,
or dramatic, as signs of its persistences.
(1) There is a pronounced antidogmatism, a sharp sense that no en
counter with any external objects will yield the practice-transfiguring,
practice-guiding knowledge for which one longs. This antidogmatism is
often specifically expressed as the sense that one’s human life, one’s life
as a subject, has no recoverable or scrutable starting point. In but one of
Wordsworth’s renderings of this sense:
Who knows the individual hour in which
His habits were first sown even as a seed.
Who that shall point as with a wand, and say
“This portion of the river of my mind
Came from yon fountain
Or there is Holderlin’s sense that the bearing of identity as a subject re
sults necessarily from an original “arc/ie-separation” of intentionality from
Being as such, “that separation through which alone object and subject be
come possible, ”66 with the consequence that intentionality in its discur
siveness is left adrift: open to captivation by a natural Being that it dimly
remembers in certain spots or moments, but unable to merge with that
Being, except apocalyptically, through death or madness (see Chapters

5.

12).

(2) There is likewise a sense of failing to arrive at a final destination or
restoration. Plots tend toward cycles of what M. H. Abrams, adapting Neo
platonic terminology, has termed procession and epistropheP^ a fall out of a
sensed power to speak and into the fragmentation of voice and identity.
63 Larmore, Romantic Legacy, p. 6g.
64 Wordsworth, Prelude (1805), II.206-10, p. 76.
65 Holderlin, ‘Judgment and Being," in Holderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, ed. and trans.
Thomas Pfau (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 37-8, at p. 37.
66 ISbr^ms, Natural Supematuralism,’p’p. 146-54.
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followed by a movement of recovery. In the register of moods, this move
ment is reflected as the familiar Romantic alternations of melancholy and
joy. Without a sense of final recovery, however, the careers and moods of
protagonists are marked more often by sudden swerves than by smooth
progress. (“But, as it sometimes chanceth, from the might/OfJoy in minds
that can no further go, / As high as we have mounted in delight/In our
dejection do we sink as low; /To me that morning did it happen so... .”)67
Throughout these swerves, protagonists remain caught between momen
tarily felt prophetic power and lack of full accomplishment. As Laurence
S. Lockridge elaborates Schiller’s view in “On Naive and Sentimental Po
etry” of our failures to arrive at full freedom, Schiller
defines the predicament of modern life as desire... . The condition of desire, once
innocence is lost, can never undo itself. Schiller’s vision is teleological and selfrealizationist: we should strive for a harmony of the faculties greater in kind than
innocent harmony. But it is a harmony that will forever elude us.*^
Our condition remains an immigrant one: not quite one of achieved free
dom and at-homeness, but not one either of an utter want of power (see
Chapters 2, 11, 12).
(3) Conjectures typically displace or undermine confident assertions
of assured accomplishment or progress. A kind of anxiety at one’s possible
unreality as a person-thinker-writer haunts efforts at prophetic speech, in
a kind of stuttering hesitation. (“If this be error, and another faith /Finds
easier access to the pious mind-----”)69 These qualifications of assertion
then often modulate into a plea or prayer for one’s reception as a personthinker-writer in the responses of longed-for successors. Someone — it is
imagined, hoped, but never quite known - may come after to testify to the
exercise of visionary power, which can never confirm itself but is always
haunted by the anxieties of possible madness and nonexistence.
(4) Formally, Romanticism’s persistences in conjecturalism, without
secured guiding arche or tele, is reflected in the predominance of less closed
forms: fragments, unfinished works, notebooks, and aphoristic collections.
As Johnston draws the connection between uncertain Romantic envisionings. Romantic swerves of mood, and literary forms.

67 Wordsworth, “Resolution and Independence,” in Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed. Jack Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), lv.22-6, p. 166.
68 Laurence S. Lockridge, The Ethics ofRomanticism (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,
1989), p. 83.
69 Wordsworth, Prelude (1805), 11.419-20, p. 88.
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[the] paradoxical relation between inspiration and dejection [resulting from a
confrontation between human imaginative powers and the unanswerable problem
of evil] explains better than almost any other set of Romantic texts the uncanny
connection between the power of Romantic imagination and its tendency to pro
duce magnificent fragments at least as often as it produces satisfying aesthetic
wholes.™
Coming face to face with human suffering, and with a thousand thousand
other reminders of the lack of fulfillment of prophetic vision, Romantic
writers find themselves not quite able to finish their thought. They seek to
sanctify a transfigured present: Romanticism does not look toward a purely
ideal world apart but seeks to find its restorations in the common day. Yet
the present it would sanctify resists the instauration of transfigurative pro
phetic vision, by displaying ineliminable remainders of cruelty, violence,
ugliness, pettiness, and hate. Romantic writers thence come not only not
to complete their thought but to doubt their very capacity for vision and
commitment, and often thence to revert to irony, so as to express what
Larmore has called a sense of “essential nonidentity between the commit
ments we have and our ability to commit ourselves.Fragmentariness,
irony, escapism, and other failures of closure of thought are less evasions
than they are the honest consequences of thought’s sense of its own mate
rial situation and limitations.
(5) Nonetheless, in some works there is a moment of gratitude: in the
concluding turns more fully toward human address and audience in cer
tain poems of Wordsworth and Holderlin; in the sense, in Updike and
Hardy, that both one’s mortality and one’s human life, however obscure,
are shared; and perhaps above all in the achievement of performative clo
sure in certain works of music - the rondo affegro finales of Mozart’s piano
sonatas, the ecstatic release of the presto third movement of Bach’s Italian
Concerto (bwv 971) after a somber andante second movement, or the al
legro molto vivace third movement, after a second movement adagio of over
whelming intensity, of Kodaly’s unaccompanied cello sonata. Such acces
sions of gratitude are beyond empirically determined flows of sensation.
They are rather connected fundamentally with our finite lives in time, as
beings open to the possibility of a freely expressive life, yet unable quite
to realize that possibility fully. As Kant notes, “it is a waste of labour to go
burrowing behind these feelings for motives; for they are immediately con70 Johnston, Hidden Wordsworth, p. 564.
71 Larmore, Romantic Legacy, p. 82.
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nected with the purest moral sentiment: gratitude, obedience, and abase
ment. ”'^2 xhe protagonist-writer-composer’s face is turned once again to
ward the human, in acceptance of the fmitude, the folly, and the depth
of human life in time.
72 Kant, The Critique ofJudgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928),
§86, Remark, p. 113: translating “Derniitigung” as “abasement” rather than “humiliation.”

